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Abstract
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-
efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions
with submodular bidders. The first such mechanism was obtained by Dobzinski, Nisan, and
Schapira [STOC’06] who gave an O(log2m)-approximation where m is the number of items.
This problem has been studied extensively since, culminating in an O(
√
logm)-approximation
mechanism by Dobzinski [STOC’16].
We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism with approximation ratio that
improves upon the state-of-the-art by an exponential factor. In particular, our mechanism
achieves an O((log logm)3)-approximation in expectation, uses only O(n) demand queries, and
has universal truthfulness guarantee. This settles an open question of Dobzinski on whether
Θ(
√
logm) is the best approximation ratio in this setting in negative.
∗Department of Computer Science, Rutgers University. Part of this work was done while the author was a
postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and was supported in part by the Simons Collaboration on Algorithms
and Geometry. Email: sepehr.assadi@rutgers.edu.
†Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, and Institute for Advanced Study. Supported in part by
the Schmidt Foundation. Email: singla@cs.princeton.edu.
i
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Preliminaries 3
2.1 Submodular and XOS Valuation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 A Fixed-Price Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 The High-Level Overview 4
4 The Main Mechanism 6
4.1 Price Trees and Their Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Partitioning Bidders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3 Formal Description of the Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5 The Analysis of Main Mechanism 9
5.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1 – Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1 – Approximation Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6 Removing the Extra Assumptions 16
6.1 The Final Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2 Approximation Ratio of Final Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7 Concluding Remarks and Open Problems 18
A Missing Details 22
A.1 Formal Definitions of Mechanisms and Truthfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1 – Fixed-Price Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
ii
1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, m items are to be allocated between n bidders. Each bidder i has a
valuation function vi that describes their value vi(S) for every bundle S of items. The goal is to
design a mechanism that finds an allocation A of items that maximizes the social welfare, which
is defined as val(A) :=
∑
i vi(Ai) where Ai is the bundle allocated to bidder i. For a mechanism
to be feasible, it needs to be computationally-efficient, i.e., run in poly(m,n) time given access
to certain queries to valuation functions, namely value queries and demand queries (see Section 2
for definitions). Mechanisms should also take into account the strategic behavior of the bidders.
A mechanism in which the dominant strategy of each bidder is to reveal their true valuation in
response to given queries is called truthful. For randomized mechanisms, we consider universally
truthful mechanisms which are distributions over truthful mechanisms (this is a stronger guarantee
than truthful-in-expectation considered also in the literature, e.g. [19, 32]; see Appendix A.1).
A “paradigmatic” [1,15,27], “central” [20,35], and “arguably the most important” [9] problem
in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design mechanisms for combinatorial auctions that are both
computationally-efficient and truthful. At the root of this problem is the question of whether there
is an inherent clash between computational-efficiency and truthfulness. On one hand, the celebrated
VCG mechanism of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves [7,28,40] is a truthful mechanism for this problem that
returns the welfare maximizing allocation. Alas, this mechanism requires finding the welfare maxi-
mizing allocation exactly, which is not possible in poly(m,n) time for most classes of valuations. On
the other hand, from a purely algorithmic point of view, constant factor approximation algorithms
exist for many interesting classes of valuations, but they are no longer truthful.
A particular case of this problem that has received significant attention is when the valuation
functions of all the bidders are submodular1 (see, e.g. [9–11,15–18,25,31,33] and references therein).
There is no poly-time algorithm for finding the optimal allocation of submodular bidders [18,25,34]
and thus VCG mechanism is not computationally-efficient here. On the other hand, by using only
value queries, a simple greedy algorithm can achieve a 2-approximation [33] and this can be further
improved to ( ee−1)-approximation [41], and even slightly better [24] by using demand queries. This
leads to one of the earliest and the most basic questions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design:
How closely can the approximation ratio of truthful mechanisms for submodular bidders
match what is possible from an algorithmic point of view that ignore strategic behavior?
Already more than a decade ago, Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [14] gave the first non-trivial
answer to this question by designing an O(
√
m)-approximation mechanism. This approximation ra-
tio was soon after exponentially improved by the same authors [15] to O(log2m), which in turn was
improved to O(logm log logm) by Dobzinski [9], and then to O(logm) by Krysta and Vo¨cking [31].
Breaking this logarithmic barrier remained elusive until a recent breakthrough of Dobzinski [11]
that achieved an O(
√
logm) approximation.
Our Result. We give an exponential factor improvement over this Θ(
√
logm) approximation
mechanism of [11], proving the following result.
Main Result. There exists a universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with
submodular valuations that achieves an approximation ratio of O((log logm)3) to the social
welfare in expectation using polynomial number of value and demand queries.
We shall note that our mechanism (as well as all previous ones in [9, 11,15,31]) actually works
for the much broader class of XOS valuations (see Section 2 for definition). Our result reduces
1A valuation function v is submodular iff v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) for all S and T ; see also Section 2.1.
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the gap between the approximation ratio of truthful mechanisms vs algorithms for submodular and
XOS bidders significantly, namely, from poly(log (m)) in prior work to poly(log log (m)).
Similar to [11], our result implies a poly(m,n) time algorithm with explicit access to valuations,
when valuations are budget additive, i.e., for every S, v(S) = min(b,
∑
j∈S v({j})) for some fixed b.
These valuations have been studied extensively in the past (see, e.g. [2,6,11]) and a simple reduction
from Knapsack shows that it is NP-hard to compute a demand query for these valuations. Yet,
similar to [11], our mechanism uses demand queries of a very specific form, and these can be
computed in poly-time. We omit the details here and instead refer the reader to [11, Section 6].
Our Techniques. All previous work on this problem [9, 11, 15, 31], at their core, relied on the
following key observation: to design truthful mechanisms for submodular or XOS bidders, “all” we
need is to find “good” estimates of the item prices in an optimal allocation; the rest can be handled
by a simple fixed-price auction using these prices. We also use this observation but depart from
prior work in the following key conceptual way. Previous work mainly aimed to learn coarse-grained
“statistics” about the prices, say, the range they should belong to [9,15], and used these statistics to
“guess” a small number of good prices (e.g., O(1) prices in [9,15], and O(
√
logm) in [11]), whereas
we instead strive to “learn” the entire price vector of items in a fine-grained way (at least for a
large fraction of items). This fine-grained view is the key factor that allows us to get much more
accurate prices and ultimately leads to the exponentially improved performance of our mechanism.
A cornerstone of our approach is a “learning process” which starts with a simple guess of item
prices and iteratively refine this guess until it converges to suitable prices for different items. Each
iteration of this process involves running several fixed-price auctions with the prices learned so
far and use the resulting allocations to refine our learned prices further. The key to the analysis
of this mechanism is the “Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma” (Lemma 5.1): Roughly speaking, we
prove that in each iteration of this process, we can either refine our learned prices significantly
(Learnable), or the fixed-price auction with the currently learned prices already gets a high-welfare
allocation (Allocatable). Thus, after a few iterations, the resulting prices have been refined enough
to allow for a high-welfare allocation. One ingredient in the proof of this lemma is an interesting
property of fixed-price auctions that stems from their greedy nature: if we run a fixed-price auction
with a random ordering of bidders, either we obtain a high-welfare allocation or we sell almost all
items (most likely to wrong bidders). Such a property was first proved (in a similar but not identical
form) by Dobzinski [11] and is closely related to other similar results about greedy algorithms for
maximum matching [30], matroid intersection [29], and constrained submodular maximization [38].
Further related work. The gap between the approximation ratio of truthful mechanisms and
general algorithms has been studied from numerous angles in the literature. It is known that
algorithms that use only poly(m,n) many value queries, or are poly-time in the input representation
(for succinctly representable valuations) can achieve only mΩ(1)-approximation [8, 10,17,17,20,39]
(the latter assuming RP 6= NP). However, these results no longer apply for mechanisms that
are allowed other natural types of queries, e.g., demand queries2. This has led the researchers
to study the communication complexity of this problem that can capture arbitrary queries to
valuations [3–5, 12–14, 18, 22, 36, 37]. Although a clear path for proving a separation between the
communication complexity of truthful mechanisms and general algorithms was shown recently
in [12] (see also [5, 22]), no such separation is still known.
2Demand queries are quite natural from an economic point of view as they simply return the most valued bundle
for the bidder at the given item prices; see Section 2.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by N the set of bidders and byM the set of items. We use bold-face letters
to denote vectors of prices and capital letters for allocations. For a price vector p and a set of items
M ′ ⊆ M , we define p(M ′) := ∑j∈M ′ pj . For an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An), we sometimes abuse
the notation and use A to denote the set of allocated items. A restriction of allocation A to bidders
in N ′ ⊆ N and items M ′ ⊆M is an allocation A′ consisting of Ai ∩M ′ for every i ∈ N ′.
2.1 Submodular and XOS Valuation Functions
We make the standard assumption that valuation vi of each bidder i is normalized, i.e., vi(∅) = 0,
and monotone, i.e., vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆M . We are interested in the case when bidders
valuations are submodular and hence capture the notion of “diminishing marginal utility” of items
for bidders. A valuation v is submodular iff v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) for any S, T ⊆M .
Submodular functions are a strict subset of XOS valuations also known as fractionally additive
valuations (see, e.g. [23, 33]) defined as follows. A valuation a is additive iff a(S) =
∑
j∈S a({j})
for every bundle S. A valuation function v is XOS iff there exists t additive valuations {a1, . . . , at}
such that v(S) = maxr∈[t] ar(S) for every S ⊆ M . Each ar is referred to as a clause of v. If
a ∈ argmaxr∈[t] ar(S), then a is called a maximizing clause for S and a({j}) is a supporting price
of item j in this maximizing clause. We say that an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) of items to n
bidders with XOS valuation is supported by prices q = (q1, . . . , qm) iff each qj is a supporting price
for item j in the maximizing clause of the bidder i to whom j is allocated, i.e., j ∈ Ai.
Query access to valuations. Since valuations have size exponential inm, a common assumption
is that valuations are specified via certain queries instead, in particular, value queries and demand
queries. A value query to valuation v on bundle S reveals the value of v(S). A demand query
specifies a price vector p on items and the answer is the “most demanded” bundle under this
pricing, i.e., a bundle S ∈ argmaxS′{v(S′)− p(S′)}.
2.2 A Fixed-Price Auction
We use a standard fixed-price auction as a subroutine in our mechanism. For an ordered set N of
bidders, M of items, and a price vector p, FixedPriceAuction(N,M,p) is defined as follows.
FixedPriceAuction(N,M,p)
1. Iterate over the bidders i of the ordered set N in the given order:
(a) Allocate Ai ∈ argmaxS⊆M{vi(S)− p(S)} to bidder i and update M ←M \Ai.
2. Return the allocation A = (A1, . . . , An).
It is easy to see that FixedPriceAuction can be implemented using one demand query per
bidder. Its truthfulness is also easy to check as bidders have no influence on the pricing mechanism.
The following lemma gives a key property of this auction used in our proofs. Variants of this
lemma have already appeared in the literature, e.g., in [9,11,15,21,26] (although we are not aware
of this exact statement). For completeness, we prove this lemma in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2.1. Let A := FixedPriceAuction(N,M,p) and δ < 1/2. Suppose O is an allocation with
supporting prices q and M∗ is the set of items j with δ · qj ≤ pj < 12 · qj. Then, val(A) ≥ δ · q(M∗).
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3 The High-Level Overview
We describe our mechanism using three parameters α := Θ(1), β := O(log logm), and γ := Θ(αβ).
Let O = (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation with welfare OPT and q = (q1, . . . , qm) be its
supporting prices (obviously, O and q are unknown). For now, let us assume that every qj belongs
to
{
1, γ, γ2, . . . , γK
}
, for some K = O(logm) (and hence prices are roughly poly(m) large).
The crux of our mechanism is to “learn” q, namely, find another price vector p such that for
some subset C ⊆M with q(C) ≈ val(O), p point-wise γ-approximates q for items in C (i.e., within
a multiplicative factor of γ). Having learned such prices, we can run a fixed-price auction with
prices p, and by Lemma 2.1, obtain an allocation with welfare ≈ γ · val(O).
In order to obtain the price vector p, we start with a rough guess p(1) for what prices should
be (say, all ones), and update our guess over (at most) β iterations. In each iteration i ∈ [β], we
use the prices p(i) learned so far to find α new price vectors p
(i)
1 , . . . ,p
(i)
α , and “explore” for each
item j ∈ M which of these α vectors best represents its price in q, and then assign that price to
item j in p(i+1). We continue this for β iterations until we converge to the desired price vector
p := p(β+1), or we decide along the way that the prices learned so far are already “good enough”.
There are three main questions to answer here: (i) how to choose which prices to explore in each
iteration, (ii) how to explore a new price for each item, and finally (iii) how to implement all this
in a truthful (and computationally-efficient) manner. We elaborate on each part below.
Part (i) – which prices to explore. This question can be best answered from the perspective
of a single item j ∈ M . Originally, we set p(1)j ∈ p(1) to be 1, and so with our assumption that
qj ∈
{
1, γ, . . . , γK
}
, price p
(i)
j will (γ
K)-approximate qj ∈ q. We want p(2)j to (γK/α)-approximate
qj in the next iteration. Thus, we simply need to check for every ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , α − 1}, whether
qj ≥ γℓ·K/α or not (using part (ii) below). By picking the largest ℓ∗ for which this is true, we
can get a (γK/α)-approximation to qj. As such, for each item, there are only α choices of prices
that we need to explore next, which allows us to devise price vectors p
(1)
1 , . . . ,p
(1)
α accordingly. We
repeat the same idea for later iterations as well, maintaining that in iteration i, price p
(i)
j ∈ p(i) will
(γK/α
i−1
)-approximate qj, and use α prices as before in p
(i)
1 , . . . ,p
(i)
α to update this to a (γK/α
i
)-
approximation for the next iteration. This way, after β = O(log logm) iterations, we obtain p
(β+1)
j
that γ-approximates qj as desired. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
In the above discussion, we talked about an item j as if its price is learned correctly throughout
(i.e., p
(i)
j is (γ
K/αi−1)-approximating qj for all i ∈ [β + 1]). Our mechanism cannot guarantee this
property for every item (but rather for most of them). Moreover, we are also not able to decide
which items have been correctly priced, so we simply treat all items as being priced correctly in the
mechanism and perform the above process for them. This means that for some items, their price
may have been learned incorrectly in some iteration; so we conservatively ignore their contribution
from now on in the analysis. A key part of our analysis is to show that this does not hurt the
performance of the mechanism by much, namely, q(C) is still a good approximation to val(O),
where C is the set of items for which we learn their prices correctly.
Part (ii) – how to explore a new price. For this part, we build on a key idea from [11] in using
fixed-price auctions themselves as a “proxy” for determining correctness of a guess for item prices.
The idea is as follows: suppose we run a fixed-price auction with prices p
(i)
ℓ for ℓ ∈ [α] that we
want to explore in an iteration i. As these prices may be very far from q yet, there is no guarantee
that this auction returns a high-welfare allocation. However, if we choose the ordering of bidders
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pj
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15Iteration one:
pj
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Iteration two:
Figure 1: An illustration of the trajectory of the prices of a single item throughout the mechanism.
Here, α = 4 and β = 2. Each block i corresponds to price γi. Arrows correspond to the price of
this item in the corresponding fixed-price auction; a solid arrow means the item was sold, while a
dashed arrow means it was not. The learned price of this item in this example is γ9.
randomly, then the only way this auction does not succeed in outputting a high-welfare allocation is
because it sold almost all the items at the current prices (most likely to wrong bidders). Hence, an
item getting sold in a certain fixed-price auction is a “good indicator” that its price in q is at least
as high as the price used in this fixed-price auction. Such an idea was used in [11] to narrow down
the range of item prices from O(logm) values to O(
√
logm), which in turn allows the mechanism
to simply guess a correct price for each item and achieves an O(
√
logm)-approximation.
We take this idea to the next step to obtain our Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma (Lemma 5.1).
Roughly speaking, we show that in each iteration i, starting from the set C(i) of correctly priced
items, either one of the α auctions for exploring prices will lead to an O(β2)-approximate allocation,
or after this iteration we will manage to further refine the prices of almost all items in C(i). I.e., we
obtain a set C(i+1) with q(C(i+1)) ≈ q(C(i)) and with p(i+1) approximating prices q for C(i+1) much
more accurately than p(i) (as described in part (i)). Hence, either during one of the iterations there
is an auction that gives us an O(β2)-approximation, or we eventually end up with p(β+1) that point-
wise γ-approximates q for a large set of items C(β+1). Therefore, by ensuring q(C(β+1)) = Ω(OPT),
a fixed-price auction with prices p(β+1) gives a γ = O(αβ)-approximation by Lemma 2.1.
This outline oversimplifies many details. Let us briefly mention two here. Firstly, running
fixed-price auctions only help us in not underpricing items for the next iteration; we also need
to take care of overpricing. This is handled by making sure there is a gap of γ between different
prices explored so that not many overpriced items can be sold in an auction. Also while for the
purpose of this discussion we simply assumed the existence of this gap, in the actual mechanism
we need to create this gap using a basic randomization idea. Secondly, our mechanism has no way
of determining (in a truthful way) which case of the Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma we are in.
This means that there are α ·β auctions in the mechanism and any one of them may give an O(β2)-
approximation welfare. (If not, then we can learn the prices accurately and the final auction would
be an O(αβ)-approximation.) The solution here is then to simply pick one of the (αβ+1) auctions
uniformly at random and allocate according to that. This way we succeed in finding a good auction
with probability at least 1/αβ and hence, in expectation, we obtain an O(αβ3)-approximation.
Part (iii) – how to ensure truthfulness. Recall that a fixed-price auction is truthful primarily
because the responses of the bidders has no effect on the price of their allocated bundle. However,
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our mechanism consists of multiple fixed-price auctions and the outcomes of these auctions do
influence the prices for later iterations. As such, to ensure truthfulness, each bidder should only
participate in the auctions of a single iteration. Hence, at the beginning of the mechanism, we
randomly partition the bidders into β + 1 groups N1, . . . , Nβ+1. Then, in each iteration i, we use
the bidders in group Ni for fixed-price auctions with prices p
(i)
1 , . . . ,p
(i)
α to learn prices p(i+1), and
in the final iteration we run one fixed-price auction with bidders Nβ+1 and prices p = p
(β+1).
This partitioning of bidders results in a key challenge: Our goal in learning the prices should
actually be different from what was stated earlier. In particular, the auctions in each iteration i with
bidders Ni should reveal the q prices of items allocated in O to bidders in N>i := Ni+1, . . . , Nβ+1,
as opposed to bidders in Ni. This is because we are no longer able to allocate any item to bidders
in N1, . . . , Ni. We handle this also by our Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma. Instead of learning
the set C(i+1) with q(C(i+1)) ≈ q(C(i)) in the Learnable case, we have a more refined statement in
which the LHS is replaced with q of items allocated only to bidders in N>i. This in turn requires
a delicate choice of parameters and analysis to balance out two opposing forces: on one hand, we
need Ni to be large enough so that we can “extrapolate” the learned prices in auctions with Ni to
N>i (in the Learnable case); on the other hand, each Ni should be small enough so that by the
time we end up learning the prices, the contribution of the remaining bidders is still large enough.
Comparison to Dobzinski [11]. We conclude this section by comparing our work with the
previous best O(
√
logm) approximation mechanism of Dobzinski [11]. As stated in Part (ii), our
mechanism builds on a key idea from [11] in using fixed price auctions as a proxy for finding “good”
prices. On a high level, the main difference between the two works is that Dobzinski [11] uses fixed
price auctions to “learn” item prices in a single-shot, but with a relatively poor accuracy. Instead,
we use fixed price auctions iteratively in order to learn the prices of (most) items quite accurately.
Concretely, assuming that all prices qj ∈
{
1, γ, . . . , γK
}
for K = O(logm), Dobzinski’s mecha-
nism can be viewed as a special case of our mechanism by setting β = 1 and α =
√
logm: Dobzinski
first uses a set N1 of bidders to run α =
√
logm auctions to learn the prices of items (to within
an O(
√
logm) factor), and then runs one more fixed price auction with these learned prices on
bidders Nβ+1 = N2. The final auction is then chosen randomly from these
√
logm+ 1 auctions to
ensure truthfulness. Considering both the prices are learned only to within an O(
√
logm) factor
and the final auction is chosen from
√
logm + 1 auctions, the approximation ratio of this mecha-
nism is O(
√
logm). Our mechanism on the other hand learns prices of items in multiple iterations
(β = O(log logm) iterations) via the Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma. This allows us to both use
a much smaller number of auctions (poly(log logm) many), and at the same time learn prices much
more accurately (again to within a poly(log logm) factor), which ultimately leads to our improved
approximation ratio of O((log logm)3).
4 The Main Mechanism
We give our main mechanism for combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations in this section.
In the following, we present our mechanism with a simplifying assumption (Assumption 1). This
assumption is made primarily for simplicity of exposition and we show how to remove it in Section 6.
Assumption 1. We assume there exists two non-negative numbers ψmin ≤ ψmax such that:
(i) for every valuation, supporting price of any item for any clause belongs to {0}∪ [ψmin : ψmax];
(ii) the ratio of these numbers, denoted by Ψ := ψmax/ψmin, is bounded by some fixed poly(m).
We further assume that the mechanism is given ψmin and ψmax as input.
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In the following, we first present a simple tree-structure, named the price tree, that we use
in our mechanism for discretizing prices at different scales. We then describe the method with
which we assign different bidders to different auctions run by our mechanism. Finally, we present
our mechanism and prove its computational efficiency and universal truthfulness guarantees. The
analysis of the approximation ratio of our mechanism—the main technical contribution of the
paper—appears in the subsequent section.
Parameters: We define and use the following parameters in our mechanism.
• α := Θ(1) – number of different auctions run in each iteration of our mechanism;
• β := O(log logΨ) – number of iterations in our mechanism;
• γ := Θ(αβ) – the accuracy to which we aim to learn the true prices.
Moreover, the above parameters satisfy the following equations:
αβ+1 ≥ logγ Ψ
20αβ ≤ γ ≤ 30αβ. (1)
It is immediate to verify that one can choose α, β, γ satisfying all the above equations.
4.1 Price Trees and Their Properties
We define a simple tree-structure used for discretizing the range of prices in [ψmin : ψmax] by our
mechanism. The first part is a geometric partition of set of available prices as follows.
Definition 4.1. We partition [ψmin : ψmax] into t :=
⌈
logγ Ψ
⌉
bins B1, . . . , Bt where values inside
each Bi are within a factor γ of each other. We use price(Bi) to denote the min value in Bi.
We now use the concepts of bins to define a multi-level partitioning of [ψmin : ψmax] with
different scales of accuracy.
Definition 4.2 (Price Tree). A price tree T is a rooted tree in which each node z is assigned
two attributes: (i) bins(z) which is a subset of bins B1, . . . , Bt with consecutive indices, and (ii)
price(z) which is the value of price(Bi) where Bi is the smallest indexed bin inside bins(z). The
tree T satisfies the following properties:
• For the root zr of T , bins(zr) := (B1, . . . , Bt).
• T has t leaf-nodes where the i-th left most leaf-node zi of T has bins(zi) = Bi.
• Every non-leaf node z of T has α children z1, . . . , zα such that bins(z1) contains the first α
fractions of bins(z), bins(z2) contains the second α fraction, and so on.
By the choice of αβ+1 ≥ t, the number of levels in T is β + 1 (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
A price tree T gives a nested partitioning of the range [ψmin : ψmax] into β + 1 levels with
different granularities. We say that a price p belongs to a node z of T iff p appears in one of the
bins in bins(z); moreover, if p = price(z), then we say p strongly belongs to z.
Definition 4.3. We say a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) is a level-i price vector iff every pj
strongly belongs to some node zj in level i of T .
We assign α canonical level-(i+1) price vectors p1, . . . ,pα to a level-i price vector p, where
in pk = (p
′
1, . . . , p
′
m) each p
′
j strongly belongs to the k-th child of zj to which pj strongly belongs.
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B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
(B1, B2) (B3, B4) (B5, B6) (B7, B8)
(B1, B2,B3, B4) (B5, B6,B7, B8)
(B1, B2,B3, B4,B5, B6,B7, B8)
Figure 2: An illustration of a price tree T with α = 2, β = 2, and t = 8. By considering only the
bold-face bins (with odd indices), we obtain the modified price tree T o.
Modified price trees. Using price trees in our mechanism directly is problematic primarily
because it is possible that a price p ∈ Bi for some bin Bi is actually closer to price(Bi+1) than
price(Bi), hence making the learning of the correct bin for p not feasible.
To fix this issue, we consider the following two modified price trees T o and T e instead: T o
is a subtree of T obtained by retaining only the odd indexed bins B1, B3, . . . in bins of T ; T e is
defined analogously by retaining all even indexed bins. In our mechanism, we pick one of T o or
T e at random and from there on, only consider the prices that belong to the bins that appear in
the corresponding modified price tree. This way, for any two price p, p′ that belong to two different
nodes of the modified tree, there is at least a factor γ gap between p and p′.
4.2 Partitioning Bidders
Our main mechanism involves partitioning the set of bidders into β+1 different groups N1, . . . , Nβ+1
and assigning them to different auctions throughout the mechanism:
• Partition(N): Let N ′ ← N and for i = 1 to β iterations: pick a random permutation of
N ′ and insert the first |N ′|/(10β) bidders into Ni; update N ′ ← N ′ \Ni. At the end, return
N1, . . . , Nβ and Nβ+1 := N
′.
We note that size of N1, . . . , Nβ are decreasing in expectation, while Nβ+1 is larger than the rest.
4.3 Formal Description of the Mechanism
We are now ready to give our main mechanism under Assumption 1. For that, we also need the
following procedure first:
• PriceUpdate(A(i)1 , . . . , A(i)α ,p(i)1 , . . . ,p(i)α ): For any item j ∈M , we let p′j be equal to pj ∈ p(i)k
where k is the largest index such that item j is allocated in A
(i)
k (if j is never allocated, we
set k = 1). Return p(i+1) = (p′1, . . . , p
′
m).
We now define our mechanism.
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PriceLearningMechanism(N,M)
1. Let (N1, N2, . . . , Nβ+1) := Partition(N).
2. Pick one of the modified trees T o or T e uniformly at random and denote it by T ⋆.
3. Let p(1) be the (unique) level-1 (root) price of T ⋆. For i = 1 to β iterations:
(a) Let p
(i)
1 , . . . ,p
(i)
α be the level-(i+1) canonical price vectors of p(i) in T ⋆ (Definition 4.3).
(b) For j = 1 to α: run FixedPriceAuction(Ni,M,
p
(i)
j
2 ) and let A
(i)
j be the allocation.
(c) W.p. (1/β), pick j⋆ ∈ [α] uniformly at random and return A(i)j⋆ as the final allocation;
otherwise, let p(i+1) := PriceUpdate(A
(i)
1 , . . . , A
(i)
α ,p
(i)
1 , . . . ,p
(i)
α ), and continue.
4. Run FixedPriceAuction(Nβ+1,M,
p(β+1)
2 ) and return the allocation A
∗.
We shall right away remark that in PriceLearningMechanism, every price vector p(i) computed
in iteration i is a level-i price vector and hence the canonical price vectors defined in each iteration
indeed do exist. We have the following theorem which is the main technical result of this paper.
Theorem 1. For a combinatorial auction with n submodular (even XOS) bidders and m items,
under Assumption 1, PriceLearningMechanism is universally truthful, uses O(n) demand queries
and polynomial time, and achieves an approximation ratio of O((log logm)3) in expectation.
We remark that our mechanism in Theorem 1 only makes O(1) queries to the valuation of each
bidder, which is clearly optimal, and results in a highly efficient mechanism (computationally).
To see that PriceLearningMechanism is truthful, notice that every bidder b is participating in
at most α fixed-price auctions of FixedPriceAuction for which the prices of items have already been
fixed entirely independent of b’s valuations (and responses). Moreover, for bidders in N1, . . . , Nβ
that participate in more than one auction, the choice of which items (if any) they are being allocated
across the auctions is entirely independent of the auction outcome and is determined by the random
coin tosses in Line (3c). This still does not imply that truth telling is a dominant strategy as a
bidder can “threat” another bidder by presenting wrong valuations in subsequent auctions they
both participate in (see, e.g. [9, 11]). To fix this, we make each bidder b output the preferences
in all fixed-price auctions b participates in simultaneously (or alternatively hide bidders responses
from each other). As was observed in [9, 11] this ensures the truthfulness of the mechanism.
Computational efficiency of PriceLearningMechanism and the bound on number of demand
queries follow immediately from the fact that each bidder is participating in at most α = Θ(1)
fixed-price auctions, each of which requires one demand query per bidder.
5 The Analysis of Main Mechanism
We now present the analysis of the approximation ratio of PriceLearningMechanism.
Notation. To avoid confusion, throughout this section, we use “i” to index the iterations, “j” to
index the auctions inside an iteration, “b” to index the bidders, and “ℓ” to index the items.
We pick an optimal allocation O = (O1, . . . , On) of items with supporting prices q = (q1, . . . , qm)
and denote by OPT the welfare of this allocation. We further define O⋆ as the restriction of O
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to items with supporting prices in q that belong to the modified price tree T ⋆ chosen by the
mechanism. Similarly, q⋆ is defined by zeroing out the price of items in q that are not allocated
by O⋆ and leaving the rest unchanged. We also define the following series of refinement of q based
on the bidders in N1, . . . , Nβ+1 and the choice of T ⋆. For every i ∈ [β + 1], q(i) = (q(i)1 , . . . , q(i)m ) is
defined so that for every item ℓ ∈M , q(i)ℓ = 0 iff ℓ is allocated in O⋆ to some bidder in N1, . . . , Ni−1
or is not allocated at all, and otherwise q
(i)
ℓ = qℓ for qℓ ∈ q⋆.
Fix any iteration i and the price vector p(i) = (p
(i)
1 , . . . , p
(i)
m ) obtained by the mechanism so far.
We say an item ℓ ∈M is correctly priced in iteration i iff p(i)ℓ belongs to the same level-i node in T ⋆
as q
(i)
ℓ . Note that by construction, p
(i)
ℓ always strongly belongs to a node, and hence for any correctly
priced item, we have p
(i)
ℓ ≤ q(i)ℓ . We use C(i) to denote the set of all items that are correctly priced
throughout all iterations 1 to i. Hence, under this definition, O⋆ = C(1) ⊇ C(2) ⊇ . . . ⊇ C(β+1).
The definition of the price tree ensures that by moving from C(1) towards C(β+1) we are learning
the prices of correctly prices items more and more accurately.
Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma. The goal of our mechanism is to learn a set C(β+1) such
that q(β+1)(C(β+1)) is still sufficiently large compared to q⋆(O⋆). Having reached such a state,
we can run a fixed price auction with price vector p(β+1)/2 with bidders Nβ+1. Since for items in
C(β+1), their price in p(β+1) and q(β+1) are within a γ factor of each other, we can invoke Lemma 2.1
and obtain an allocation with welfare at least γ fraction of q(β+1)(C(β+1)).
Of course, in general, it is too much to expect that our mechanism can converge to a particular
price vector q⋆ (think of a case where there are many different optimal allocations with different
prices; converging to one such price vector necessarily means not converging to the other ones).
The following lemma, which is the heart of the proof, however states that in each iteration, we can
either “learn” the prices of most items more accurately than before, or we can already “allocate”
the items efficiently enough at the current prices.
Lemma 5.1 (Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma). For any iteration i ∈ [β], conditioned
on any outcome of first i− 1 iterations and choice of T ⋆:
(i) either E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
] ≥ q(i)(C(i))− OPT3β , where the expectation is over Ni;
(ii) or E
[
val(A
(i)
j⋆ )
]
≥ OPT
200α·β2
, where the expectation is over Ni and j
⋆ ∈ [α].
We refer to the first case as Learnable and to the second one as Allocatable.
We prove Lemma 5.1 next and then use it to conclude the proof of Theorem 1.
5.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1 – Learnable-Or-Allocatable Lemma
We start with a high level overview. We prove this lemma in three steps:
(i) No underestimating prices: We first show (Lemma 5.2) that for any of the auctions in this
iteration, either most of the correctly priced items (with respect to this auction) are sold, or
this auction itself can result in a high welfare. This step allows us to argue that for many of
the items we can sell them in these auctions with a price at least as high as their true price,
and hence we will not underestimate their prices in this iteration. The proof of this part
crucially uses the fact that the bidders are coming in a random order and is along the lines
of a similar argument by Dobzinski [11].
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(ii) No overestimating prices: We then show (Lemma 5.5) that in these auctions only a small
fraction of items may continue to get sold even past their correct price. Roughly speaking,
this is because if we could actually sell many items in auctions with higher prices, this implies
that the true welfare of the auction is larger than OPT, a contradiction. This part relies on
the “price gap” we introduced in price trees by picking T e or T o (instead of T itself).
(iii) Handling removed bidders: Finally, in Claim 5.6 we argue that even if we ignore the items for
bidders in Ni (as the mechanism no longer considers these bidders), the remaining correctly
priced items still have a substantial contribution. This part of the proof uses the fact that
we only consider a small random subset Ni of the remaining bidders.
We now present the formal proof. Throughout the proof, we fix i ∈ [β] and condition on the
outcome of the first i − 1 iterations and the choice of T ⋆. Conditioning on the outcome of the
first i − 1 iterations fixes the set of bidders N1, . . . , Ni−1 but bidders in Ni are chosen randomly
from the remaining bidders. Fixing the bidders N1, . . . , Ni−1 also fixes the price vector q
(i). This
conditioning also fixes the level-i price vector p(i) and its canonical level-(i + 1) price vectors
p
(i)
1 , . . . ,p
(i)
α . The set C(i) of items that have been correctly priced so far is also fixed.
We partition the correctly priced items C(i) into α sets D
(i)
1 , . . . ,D
(i)
α , defined as follows. For
an item ℓ ∈ C(i), let zℓ denote the node in level i of T that both p(i)ℓ and q(i)ℓ belong to. Suppose
the child-node of zℓ to which q
(i)
ℓ belongs is zℓ,j for some j ∈ [α]. We place item ℓ in D(i)j in this
case. Note that under this partitioning, the level (i+1) node zℓ,j to which q
(i)
ℓ belongs is the same
node that pℓ ∈ p(i)j (strongly) belongs to; thus, for items in D(i)j , p(i)j ≤ q(i).
In the following lemma, we use the construction of Partition to argue that for any j ∈ [α], we
either allocate most items in D
(i)
j in the fixed price auction with price vector p
(i)
j or otherwise this
auction is obtaining a large welfare.
Lemma 5.2. For any j ∈ [α], we have 20β · E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+ E
[
q
(i)(A
(i)
j ∩D(i)j )
]
≥ q(i)(D(i)j ).
Proof. We define N≥i := N \ (N1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ni−1). In the following, all expectations are taken over
the choice of Ni from N≥i. Recall that in Partition, Ni is chosen from N≥i by picking a random
permutation and picking the first |N≥i| /(10β) bidders in Ni.
Define ODNi as the restriction of O
⋆ to items in D
(i)
j and bidders in Ni. Similarly, define O
D
N>i
as the restriction of O to items in D
(i)
j and bidders in N>i := N≥i \ Ni. Note that q(i)(Dj) =
q
(i)(ODNi) + q
(i)(ODN>i) (recall that q
(i) gives price 0 to items not allocated to bidders in N≥i).
Proof of this lemma is by a simple combination of the following two claims.
Claim 5.3. Deterministically, val(A
(i)
j ) ≥ q(i)(ODNi \A
(i)
j )/2.
Proof. For any bidder b ∈ Ni, when it was bidder b’s turn to pick a set in allocation A(i)j of
FixedPriceAuction(Ni,M,p
(i)
j /2), b could have picked O
D
b \ A(i)j ⊆ ODNi and obtain the profit of
vb(O
D
b \ A(i)j )− p(i)j (ODb \ A(i)j )/2 ≥ q(i)(ODb \A(i)j )− p(i)j (ODb \ A(i)j )/2 ≥ q(i)(ODb \ A(i)j )/2.
The first inequality is because q(i) is a supporting price for ODb \A(i)j and the second one is because
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p
(i)
j ≤ q(i) on the items in D(i)j . As bidder b maximizes the profit by picking A(i)j,b, we have
val(A
(i)
j ) =
∑
b∈Ni
vb(A
(i)
j,b) ≥
∑
b∈Ni
q
(i)(ODb \A(i)j )/2 = q(i)(ODNi \ A
(i)
j )/2. Claim 5.3
Claim 5.4. By randomness of choice of Ni from N≥i, E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ ( 110β )·E
[
q
(i)(ODN>i \ A
(i)
j )/2
]
.
Proof. For the purpose of this proof, it helps to think of picking Ni alternatively by repeating the
following for ni := |Ni| steps: sample a bidder uniformly at random from N≥i, include it in Ni ,
and remove it from consideration for sampling from now on. It is immediate that the distribution
of Ni is the same under this and the original definition.
For every k ∈ [ni], define Ni,k ⊆ Ni as the set Ni constructed before step k and OD≥k as the
restriction of O⋆ to D
(i)
j and N≥i \ Ni,k. Thus, OD≥k ⊇ ODN>i and hence q(i)(OD≥k) ≥ q(i)(ODN>i)
for every k. Recall that FixedPriceAuction operates in a greedy manner and hence allocation of
bidders participating in the auction before step k are already determined by step k. Define A<k as
the set of items allocated by auction before step k and let uk := vb(A
(i)
j,b) where b is the chosen bidder
in step k and A
(i)
j,b is the allocation b will get by participating in FixedPriceAuction(Ni,M,p
(i)
j /2).
We first prove that uk ≥ q(OD≥k,b \ A<k)/2. This is precisely because of the same reason as in
Claim 5.3 that b could have chosen OD≥k,b\A<k but decided to pick another set. Define n≥i := |N≥i|.
Recall that b is chosen uniformly at random from the (n≥i − k + 1) bidders at step k and hence,
E
b
[uk] ≥ 1
n≥i − k + 1 ·
q
(i)(OD≥k \ A<k)
2
≥ 1
n≥i
· q
(i)(OD≥k \ A<k)
2
. (2)
We can thus write,
E
Ni
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
=
ni∑
k=1
E
Ni,k
E
b
[uk | Ni,k]
≥ 1
2n≥i
·
ni∑
k=1
· E
Ni,k
[
q
(i)(OD≥k \ A<k) | Ni,k
]
(by Eq (2))
≥ 1
2n≥i
·
ni∑
k=1
E
Ni
[
q
(i)(ODN≥i \A
(i)
j )
]
(as ODN≥i ⊆ OD≥k and A
(i)
j ⊇ A<k always)
=
ni
n≥i
· E
Ni
[
q
(i)(ODN≥i \A
(i)
j )/2
]
=
(
1
10β
)
· E
[
q
(i)(ODN≥i \ A
(i)
j )/2
]
. Claim 5.4
We can now conclude the proof of Lemma 5.2 as follows. By Claims 5.3 and 5.4,
20β · E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ E
[
q
(i)(ODNi \ A
(i)
j ) + q
(i)(ODN≥i \A
(i)
j )
]
= E
[
q
(i)(D
(i)
j \ Aj)
]
= q(i)(D
(i)
j )− E
[
q
(i)(D
(i)
j ∩A(i)j )
]
.
This concludes the proof. Lemma 5.2
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The quantity A
(i)
j ∩D(i)j bounded in Lemma 5.2 is closely related to the set of correctly priced
items at iteration i+1, namely C(i+1). The only difference between the two sets is that some items
in A
(i)
j ∩D(i)j can be allocated even in A(i)k for k > j and hence in PriceUpdate, we assign a larger
price to them. In the following, we prove that the contribution of such items cannot be too large.
Lemma 5.5. We have q(i)(C(i+1)) ≥∑αj=1 q(i)(A(i)j ∩D(i)j )− OPT10β .
Proof. By definition of PriceUpdate, we know that items in A
(i)
j ∩ D(i)j will join C(i+1)j iff they
do not belong to some A
(i)
k for k > j. For each k > j, let OEk be the set of items in D
(i)
j ∩ A(i)j
that are also allocated in A
(i)
k . Then, OEj+1 ∪ . . .∪OEα forms the set of all items in D(i)j that the
mechanism overestimates their price in iteration i. We bound the contribution of such items.
Fix some k > j. Consider the level i+1 of the price tree T ⋆. There are αi nodes in this level to
which the q(i)-price of an item inD
(i)
j can belong to. Let oek,1, . . . , oek,αi be the number of items cor-
responding to these nodes that were allocated in A
(i)
k as well. Hence, |OEk| =
∑αi
ℓ=1 oek,ℓ. Moreover,
let pk,1, . . . , pk,αi be the maximum prices that belong to these nodes. Finally, let p
′
k,1, . . . , p
′
k,αi
be
the prices that these items were sold in A
(i)
k . Because T ⋆ is either T o or T e, we have pk,ℓ ≤ γk−j ·p′k,ℓ
(there is a factor γ gap between the maximum price of any bin Bx and minimum price of Bx+2).
Since all the items in OEk are sold in a single application of FixedPriceAuction, we know that
there exists an allocation with supporting prices p′k,ℓ for oek,ℓ items for all ℓ ∈ [αi]. As such,
OPT ≥
αi∑
ℓ=1
p′k,ℓ · oek,ℓ ≥ γk−j ·
αi∑
ℓ=1
pk,ℓ · oek,ℓ ≥ γk−j · q(i)(OEk), (3)
by definition of pk,ℓ as the maximum price inside the nodes of T ⋆ that prices of q(i)(OEk) belong
to. Summing up Eq (3) for all choices of k > j, we have
α∑
k=j+1
q
(i)(OEk) ≤
α∑
k=j+1
1
γk−j
· OPT ≤ 2
γ
·OPT.
Finally, as there are α choices for j, we have
 α∑
j=1
q
(i)(A
(i)
j ∩D(i)j )

− q(i)(C(i+1)) ≤
α∑
j=1
2
γ
· OPT = 2α
γ
·OPT ≤ OPT
10β
,
by the choice of γ ≥ 20αβ in Eq (1). Lemma 5.5
So far we only considered prices with respect to q(i). We now extend the bounds to q(i+1), for
which we need to remove the correctly priced items corresponding to bidders in Ni.
Claim 5.6. We have E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
] ≥ E [q(i)(C(i+1))]− OPT10β .
Proof. For a bidder b, we write C
(i)
b as the set of items in C
(i) that are allocated to b in O⋆ (i.e.,
take their price in q⋆ because of bidder b); this is similarly defined for C
(i+1)
b . We can write,
E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
= E

q(i)(C(i+1))− ∑
b∈Ni
q
(i)(C
(i+1)
b )

 ≥ E

q(i)(C(i+1))− ∑
b∈Ni
q
(i)(C
(i)
b )

 ,
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because C(i+1) ⊆ C(i). Since each bidder joins Ni with probability (1/10β), this implies
E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
≥ E
[
q
(i)(C(i+1))
]
− 1
10β
· q(i)(C(i)b ) ≥ E
[
q
(i)(C(i+1))
]
− OPT
10β
. Claim 5.6
We now have all the ingredients needed to prove Lemma 5.1.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. By applying Lemma 5.2 to every j ∈ [α], we have
20β ·
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+ E

 α∑
j=1
q
(i)(A
(i)
j ∩D(i)j )

 ≥
α∑
j=1
q
(i)(D
(i)
j ). (4)
The RHS of above is clearly q(i)(C(i)). The second term in the LHS can be upper bounded by
Lemma 5.5 and Claim 5.6,
E

 α∑
j=1
q
(i)(A
(i)
j ∩D(i)j )

 ≤ E [q(i)(C(i+1))]+ OPT
10β
≤ E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
+
2 ·OPT
10β
.
Plugging in these bounds in Eq (4), we obtain
20β ·
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+ E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
≥ q(i)(C(i))− OPT
5β
. (5)
Now let us consider two cases. First suppose,
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ OPT
200β2
. (6)
In this case, E
[
val(A
(i)
j⋆ )
]
for j⋆ chosen uniformly at random from [α] is at least OPT
100αβ2
, hence
satisfying item (ii) of the lemma (Allocatable case). We now consider the other case where the LHS
of Eq (6) is smaller than the RHS. Plugging in this bound in Eq (5) implies that
E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
≥ q(i)(C(i))− OPT
5β
− 20β · OPT
200β2
> q(i)(C(i))− OPT
3β
.
This satisfies item (i) of the lemma (Learnable case), concluding the proof. Lemma 5.1
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1 – Approximation Ratio
We now prove the bound on expected approximation ratio of PriceLearningMechanism. We first
need some definitions.
For an iteration i ∈ [β + 1], we use Alg(i) = (Alg1, . . . , Algn) to denote the allocation returned
by our mechanism, conditioned on the mechanism reaching iteration i and on the outcomes of
N1, . . . , Ni−1 as well as the choice of T ⋆. We use ALG(i) to denote the welfare of allocation Alg(i).
We note that except for i = β + 1, Alg(i) is a random variable.
Our main tool in this section is the following inductive lemma.
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Lemma 5.7. For i ∈ [β + 1],
E
[
ALG(i)
]
≥ 1
200αβ3
·
(
1− 1
β
)β+1−i
·
(
q
(i)(C(i))− OPT
3β
(β + 1− i)
)
,
where the expectation is taken over the choice of Ni, Ni+1, . . . , Nβ .
Before proving this lemma, we show how it immediately implies the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 – Approximation Ratio. By Lemma 5.7 for i = 1,
E
[
ALG(1)
]
≥ 1
200αβ3
·
(
1− 1
β
)β
·
(
q
(1)(C(1))− OPT
3β
· β
)
= Ω
( 1
αβ3
)
·
(
q
(1)(C(1))− OPT
3
)
.
The only random event that we have not conditioned on in q(1)(C(1)) is the choice of T ⋆. Let ALG
denote the welfare of allocation returned by the mechanism. We have,
E [ALG] = Ω
( 1
αβ3
)
· E
T ⋆
[
q
(1)(C(1))− OPT
3
]
= Ω
( 1
αβ3
)
·
(
OPT
2
− OPT
3
)
= Ω
( 1
αβ3
)
· OPT,
where the second equality is because T ⋆ is chosen uniformly at random to be T o or T e and the
bins in these two price trees partition the prices in q(O) by Assumption 1. As α = Θ(1), and β =
O(log logΨ), which is O(log logm) under Assumption 1, we obtain that PriceLearningMechanism
achieves an O((log logm)3) approximation in expectation. Theorem 1
We prove Lemma 5.7 using backward induction. We first show that the lemma easily holds true
for the base case, namely, for i = β + 1, because of the performance of FixedPriceAuction for
correctly priced items (Lemma 2.1). The heart of the induction step lies in Learnable-Or-Allocatable
Lemma (Lemma 5.1) that states E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
is close to q(i)(C(i)) unless we already have a
good allocation. So we first use the induction hypothesis to show that the expected welfare of the
mechanism is close to E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
and then use Lemma 5.1 to show it is close to q(i)(C(i)).
Proof of Lemma 5.7. We use backward induction on i. Consider the base case for i = β+1, where
we want to show the following (note that ALG(β+1) is no longer a random variable)
ALG(β+1) ≥ 1
200αβ3
·
(
q
(β+1)(C(β+1))
)
.
Since our mechanism has already reached iteration i = β + 1, this means that for every correctly
priced item j ∈ C(β+1), pj ∈ p(β+1) and qj ∈ q(β+1) both belong to a leaf-node of T ⋆, and
consequently the same price bin. As such, by construction of bins, pj ≤ qj ≤ γ ·pj and hence running
FixedPriceAuction(Nβ+1,M,p
(i+1)/2) in this step of PriceLearningMechanism, by Lemma 2.1,
results in allocation with welfare,
ALG(β+1) ≥ 1
γ
· q(β+1)(C(β+1)) > 1
200αβ3
· q(β+1)(C(β+1)),
by the choice of γ = Θ(αβ) in Eq (1). This proves the induction base.
We now prove the induction step. Suppose the lemma is true for iterations ≥ i+1 and we prove
the induction step for iteration i. Notice that w.p. 1/β the mechanism outputs an allocation A
(i)
j⋆
for j⋆ chosen randomly from [α], and otherwise it continues to the next iteration. This implies:
E
[
ALG(i)
]
≥ 1
β
E
Ni,j⋆
[
val(A
(i)
j⋆ )
]
+
(
1− 1
β
)
· E
Ni
[
ALG(i+1)
]
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≥ 1
β
· E
Ni,j⋆
[
val(A
(i)
j⋆ )
]
+
(
1− 1
β
)β+1−i
E
Ni
[
1
200αβ3
(
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))− OPT
3β
(β − i)
)]
,
(7)
where the second inequality uses induction hypothesis. Now to prove the induction step we consider
the two cases corresponding to Lemma 5.1:
(i) Learnable case, i.e., E
[
q
(i+1)(C(i+1))
] ≥ q(i)(C(i))− OPT3β : Combining this with Eq (7),
E
[
ALG(i)
]
≥
(
1− 1
β
)β+1−i
· E
Ni
[
1
200αβ3
(
q
(i)(C(i))− OPT
3β
− OPT
3β
(β − i)
)]
,
which implies the induction step.
(ii) Allocatable case, i.e., E
[
val(A
(i)
j⋆ )
]
≥ OPT
200α·β2
: Combining this with Eq. (7),
E
[
ALG(i)
]
≥ OPT
200αβ3
≥ 1
200αβ3
(
1− 1
β
)β+1−i
E
[
q
(i)(C(i))− OPT
2β
(β + 1− i)
]
,
where the last inequality uses OPT ≥ q(i)(C(i)) and implies the induction step.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. Lemma 5.7
6 Removing the Extra Assumptions
We now show how to remove Assumption 1 and prove our main result in its full generality. We
shall emphasize that the main contribution of our work is in establishing Theorem 1; the remaining
ideas here are standard for the most part and appear in similar forms in previous work on truthful
mechanisms, e.g. in [9, 11,15]. We present them for completeness.
Let O = (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation with welfare OPT and supporting prices q. In
order to remove Assumption 1, we find prices ψmin and ψmax such that ψmax/ψmin = O(m
2), and for
most items allocated by O, their price in q belongs to the range [ψmin : ψmax]; here, “most items”
should be interpreted as items with prices in q that is a constant fraction of OPT. Having found
such prices, we can then run PriceLearningMechanism from Section 4 and apply Theorem 1 to
finalize the proof (strictly speaking, Assumption 1 stated that all prices in all valuations of bidders
need to be in range [ψmin : ψmax]; however, as is evident from the proof of Theorem 1, we only
applied this assumption to prices in q).
To find ψmin and ψmax, we partition N into two (almost) equal-size groups Nstat and Nmech
randomly. We run any constant-factor approximation algorithm (and not a truthful mechanism)
for welfare maximization with bidders in Nstat and items M , say, the algorithm of [33], to compute
a value ALGstat which is an O(1)-approximation to OPTstat namely, the value of welfare maximizing
allocation for Nstat andM . We completely ignore the allocation of these bidders and instead only set
ψmin := ALGstat/m
2 and ψmax := ALGstat ·Θ(1). We then run PriceLearningMechanism(Nmech,M)
with ψmin and ψmax, and return the resulting allocation to bidders in Nmech.
The intuition behind the approach is that because we partitioned N into two random groups,
OPTstat and consequently ALGstat should be an O(1)-approximation to OPTmech, namely, the value
of welfare optimizing allocation for bidders in Nmech (this intuition is not quite correct but for
the moment let us ignore this fact). Thus, in an optimal allocation of M to Nmech, no item have
16
price more than ψmax and also the total contribution of items with price smaller than ψmin is
negligible, hence we can safely ignore them. This in turn implies that Assumption 1 holds and
by Theorem 1, PriceLearningMechanism(Nmech,M) outputs an allocation with welfare ALGmech
such that E [ALGmech] ≥ OPTmech · Ω
(
1
(log logm)3
)
. Moreover, by the choice of Nmech, we have
E [OPTmech] = OPT/2. Thus, this should gives us an O((log logm)
3) approximation in expectation.
As stated earlier, there is a slight problem with the above intuition. One cannot in general
guarantee that by partitioning the bidders into two parts randomly, each part will have roughly
the same contribution to the value of OPT. In particular, if there exists a bidder with a much
higher contribution to OPT than the rest, the above approach is bound to fail. So we take care of
this case separately as follows: With probability half, we simply run a second-price auction on the
grand bundle M and sell it to the highest bidder entirely. With the remaining half probability, we
run the above procedure. This ensures that if such a bidder exists, we get her contribution with
probability half. Otherwise, with probability half, we can run the previous analysis.
6.1 The Final Mechanism
Our final mechanism is as follows.
FinalMechanism(N,M)
1. With probability 1/2, run a second-price auction on grand bundle M with all bidders,
return the resulting allocation, and terminate. With the remaining probability, continue.
2. Pick Nstat by sampling each bidder inN independently and w.p. 1/2. LetNmech := N\Nstat.
3. Run the 2-approximation algorithm of [33] on items M and bidders Nstat. Let ALGstat be
the welfare of the returned allocation. Let ψmin := ALGstat/m
2 and ψmax := 8 · ALGstat.
4. Run PriceLearningMechanism(Nmech,M) with ψmin and ψmax, and return the allocation.
We have the following theorem that formalizes our main result from Section 1.
Theorem 2. For a combinatorial auction with n submodular (even XOS) bidders and m items,
FinalMechanism is universally truthful, uses poly(m,n) demand and value queries, and achieves an
approximation ratio of O((log logm)3) in expectation.
The proof of truthfulness of Theorem 2 is quite easy. The case where we run the second-price
auction is clearly truthful. For the other case, note that we never allocate any item to bidders in
Nstat and so they might as well reveal their true valuations in response to the algorithm in Line (3).
Finally, PriceLearningMechanism with bidders Nmech is truthful by Theorem 1. The bound on
the number of queries also follows from [33] for Line (3) and Theorem 1 for Line (4), and since the
second-price auction can be implemented with n value queries for the grand bundle. It thus only
remains to analyze the approximation ratio of FinalMechanism, which we do in the next section.
6.2 Approximation Ratio of Final Mechanism
We use the following standard result that follows directly from Chernoff-Hoeffding bound.
Lemma 6.1 (cf. [9, 11,15]). Let O = (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation of items M to bidders
N with welfare OPT. Suppose we sample each i ∈ N w.p. ρ independently to obtain N ′. If for every
i ∈ N , we have vi(Oi) ≤ ǫ · OPT, then
∑
i∈N ′ vi(Oi) ≥ (ρ/2) ·OPT w.p. at least 1− 2 · exp
(− ρ2·ǫ).
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Fix an optimal allocation O = (O1, . . . , On) of items to bidders in N with welfare OPT. We
say that a bidder i ∈ N is dominant iff vi(Oi) ≥ OPT/8. For the analysis, we consider two cases:
either (i) there exists at least one dominant bidder, or (ii) no bidder is dominant.
Case (i): A dominant bidder exists. W.p. half, we decide to run the second-price auction.
Let i be the bidder that gets the grand bundle M in the auction. Clearly i has to be a dominant
bidder in this case and thus vi(M) ≥ OPT/8 already. As such, in this case, the expected welfare of
the allocation is at least OPT/16, concluding the proof.
Case (i): No dominant bidder exists. W.p. half, we decide not to run the second-price
auction. Let OPTstat and OPTmech be the welfare of the optimal allocation of M to Nstat and
Nmech, respectively. By Lemma 6.1, applied to choice of Nstat and N \ Nstat (both sets have the
same distribution) with ρ = 1/2 and ε = 1/8, and a union bound, w.p. at least 1/2, we have
1
4
·OPT ≤ OPTstat ≤ OPT and 1
4
· OPT ≤ OPTmech ≤ OPT. (8)
In the following, we condition on the (independent) events that we do not run the second-price
auction, and that Eq (8) holds, which happens w.p. 1/4.
Fix a welfare maximizing allocation of M to Nmech with welfare OPTmech and supporting prices
q = (q1, . . . , qm). Since we run a 2-approximation algorithm in Line (3), we know that
1
8 · OPT ≤
ALGstat ≤ OPT by Eq (8). Hence, setting ψmax = 8 · ALGstat ensures that qj ≤ ψmax for every
item j ∈ M . Moreover, let M ′ ⊆ M be the set of items j such that qj ≤ ψmin. By definition of
ψmin = ALGstat/m
2 and since ALGstat > OPTmech/8, we get q(M
′) ≤ OPTmech/2 (as m ≫ 8). As
such, we can simply ignore the contribution of all items in M ′ and still have a set of items M \M ′
that can be allocated to bidders in Nmech with welfare at least OPTmech/2 ≥ OPT/8. Moreover,
the supporting prices of these items now belong to [ψmin : ψmax]. Hence, we can apply Theorem 1
under Assumption 1 and obtain that in this case, the expected welfare of the allocation is at most
O((log logm)3) times smaller than OPT, finishing the proof of Theorem 2.
7 Concluding Remarks and Open Problems
We gave a randomized, computationally-efficient, and universally truthful mechanism for combina-
torial auctions with submodular (even XOS) bidders that achieves anO((log logm)3)-approximation.
This reduces the gap between the approximation ratio achievable by truthful mechanisms vs arbi-
trary algorithms for this problem by an exponential factor from poly(log (m)) to poly(log log (m)).
The obvious question left open by our work is whether this gap can be improved further. We
do not believe in any way that our O((log logm)3) approximation is the best possible3. On the
other hand, the limit of our approach seems to be an Ω(log logm) approximation. It is a fascinating
open question whether one can improve the approximation factor all the way down to a constant.
However, even improving the approximation ratio of our mechanism down to O(log logm) already
seems challenging, and is an interesting open question. On the lower bound front, proving any
separation between the power of truthful mechanisms and algorithms when the access to input is
via arbitrary queries, namely, the communication complexity setting, is also very interesting.
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3Indeed, using a slightly more nuanced argument, our bounds can be improved to O( (log logm)
3
log log logm
); however as this
Θ(log log logm) improvement is minor and for the sake of clarity, we used the slightly weaker analysis in the paper.
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A Missing Details
A.1 Formal Definitions of Mechanisms and Truthfulness
Let V be a class of valuation functions defined over M , say, all submodular functions 2M → R+,
and A be the set of all possible allocations of M to n bidders. A deterministic mechanism for
combinatorial auctions is a pair (f,p) where f : Vn → A (representing the allocation to bidders)
and p = (p1, . . . , pn) where pi : Vn → R+ (representing the price charged for item i). A randomized
mechanism is simply a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms.
Definition A.1 (Truthfulness and Universal Truthfulness). A deterministic mechanism (f, p) is
truthful iff for all i ∈ N , vi, v′i ∈ V and v−i ∈ Vn−1, we have,
vi(f(vi, v−i)i)− pi(vi, v−i) ≥ vi(f(v′i, v−i)i)− pi(v′i, v−i).
A randomized mechanism is universally truthful iff it is a distribution over truthful mechanisms.
We note that beside universal truthfulness, the notion of truthful-in-expectation is also con-
sidered for randomized mechanisms that guarantee that bidding truthfully maximizes the expected
profit; see, e.g. [19, 20, 32] and references therein. This is a much weaker guarantee than universal
truthfulness we consider in this paper. In particular such mechanisms are only applicable when
bidders are risk neutral and have no information about the outcomes of the random coin flips before
they need to act; see [15, Section 1.2] for more details.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1 – Fixed-Price Auctions
Lemma (Restatement of Lemma 2.1). Let A := FixedPriceAuction(N,M,p) and δ < 1/2 be a
parameter. Suppose O is any allocation with supporting prices q and M⋆ ⊆ M is the set of items
j with δ · qj ≤ pj < 12 · qj. Then, val(A) ≥ δ · q(M⋆).
Proof. Define the allocation O⋆ = (O⋆1, . . . , O
⋆
n) as the restriction of O to M
⋆. Define Ai = O
⋆
i \ A
for every i ∈ N and A := A1 ∪ . . .∪An. Bidder i could have chosen Ai in FixedPriceAuction but
decided to pick another bundle Ai instead. This implies that:
vi(Ai)− p(Ai) ≥ vi(Ai)− p(Ai). (9)
We now use Eq (9) to prove the lemma. We have,
val(A) =
n∑
i=1
vi(Ai) = p(A) +
n∑
i=1
(vi(Ai)− p(Ai))
≥ p(A) +
n∑
i=1
(vi(Ai)− p(Ai)) ≥ p(A) +
n∑
i=1
(q(Ai)− p(Ai))
by Eq (9) and since Ai ⊆ O⋆i ⊆ Oi. Now using as pj ≤ qj/2 for all j ∈ A ⊆ O⋆ =M⋆, we get
val(A) ≥ p(A) +
n∑
i=1
p(Ai)
≥ p(O⋆) ≥ δ · q(O⋆),
where the last two inequalities use O⋆ ⊆ A ∪A and A ∩A = ∅, and that pj ≥ δ · qj for all j ∈ O⋆.
This concludes the proof as q(O⋆) = q(M⋆) by definition.
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